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Discussione: Etf Giappone

  1. #1
    Buongiorno,
    vorrei incominciare ad accumulare quote sulle azioni Giapponesi tramite gli Etf armonizzati quotati a Milano.
    Ne ho individuati 3...Db-x-Trackers Msci Japan Trn Index oppure Ishares Msci Japan oppure Lyxor Etf Japan...Siccome la strategia è impostata come Pac a lungo termine avrei scelto il primo Dd-x-Trackers ecc.. che non dà dividendo perchè viene reinvestito..Cosa ne pensate???Grazie e Buona Serata.Woolf.

  2. #2
    Capitolazione dei listini azionari giapponesi.

    Oct. 8 (Bloomberg) -- Japan's shares plunged, driving the Nikkei 225 Stock Average to its third-largest decline. The accelerating credit crisis prompted a sell-off that erased more than $250 billion in equity value.

    Toyota Motor Corp., the world's second-largest carmaker, fell the most in 21 years after Nikko Citigroup Ltd. cut its rating. Mizuho Financial Group Inc. slid 7.7 percent as bankruptcies surged to the highest since May 2003. Elpida Memory Inc., the nation's largest computer memory maker, dropped to a record low as the yen strengthened to 100 against the dollar.

    ``It's capitulation,'' said Masafumi Oshiden, a Tokyo-based fund manager at BlackRock Inc., which oversees more than $1.4 trillion. ``There are lots of forced sellers. If you're a fund that's going bust you need to close out all your positions.''

    The Nikkei 225 Stock Average sank 952.58, or 9.4 percent, to 9,203.32 at the close of trading in Tokyo, the steepest fall since a 15 percent drop in October 1987. The broader Topix index declined 78.60, or 8 percent, to 899.01, also the biggest loss in 21 years. Losses accelerated through the day as markets across Asia plummeted and Indonesia's exchange suspended trading.

    Nippon Steel Corp., the nation's largest maker of the alloy, dropped 12 percent to 281 yen after its chairman said in an interview with the Nikkei that global steel demand will slow. JFE Holdings Inc., the No. 2, fell 14 percent to 2,330 yen


    The $250 billion in value erased from the main board of the Tokyo exchange was the most for a single day since at least 1989.

    Toyota plunged 12 percent to 3,280 yen, the biggest slide since October 1987. Nikko Citigroup's Noriyuki Matsushima cut his rating to ``sell'' from ``buy,'' saying operating profit is likely to be 1.1 trillion yen ($10.9 billion) for the year ending in March, 31 percent below the company's estimate.

    Interest Rate Cut?

    The Nikkei newspaper said Toyota's operating profit may drop 40 percent this year to 1.3 trillion due to slowing demand for cars.

    Isuzu Motors Ltd., Japan's largest maker of light-duty trucks, slid 14 percent to 192 yen, the steepest fall since August 2004. Hino Motors Ltd., which makes trucks for Toyota, dropped 14 percent to 295 yen after Nikko Citigroup also lowered the shares to ``hold'' from ``buy.''

    ``Investors are liquidating their stock positions because they are frightened of taking on any risks,'' said Takashi Miyazaki, who helps oversee $61 billion at Mitsubishi UFJ Asset Management Co. in Tokyo. ``The jury is still out on how bad this is going to turn out for the global economy.''

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...d=aFFX4cYQ.frs

  3. #3
    Wed Oct 8, 2008
    The value of the Tokyo exchange's first section finished Wednesday at 287 trillion yen ($2,835 billion), down $250 billion. .MV1.T

    Analysts said that even at lower valuations, investors would still shun stocks as more companies were expected to cut their earnings forecasts.

    "Investors are not selling because Japanese stocks are good or bad, but because of the credit squeeze," said Kenichi Hirano, operating officer at Tachibana Securities.

    "I see around 9,300 as the possible bottom for the Nikkei average, considering projected corporate earnings for the year ending March 2009."

    The projected price-earnings ratio of the Nikkei stock average tumbled to a 37-year low at 12.5 times on Tuesday, according to the Nikkei business daily.

    Daisuke Uno, chief strategist at Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp, said the Nikkei was likely to see further declines due to a lack of policy responses from Japanese authorities, such as additional fiscal spending steps to support the economy.

    He added it was also hard to expect any major initiatives from the meeting of Group of Seven finance ministers on Friday.


    http://www.reuters.com/article/tokyo...BrandChannel=0

  4. #4
    é un cosiglio del tutt PERSONALE!!!! io se fossi in te, ci starei alla larga, non da quelli Giapponesi, MA DA TUTTI gli EF, sono manovrati, in un modo INDEGNO e risentono degli umori giornalieri borsistici, indipendentemente dai risultati economci aziendali, della nazione o/e della situazione borsistica nazionale di riferimento (Giappone, India, Cina ecc...). Forse un mordi e fuggi!!! ma non sicuramente a lungo termine. Ovviamente, ogniuno é libero di pensarla a suo modo!!!!!

    con stima.............. Werther
    i miei diritti, finiscono là dove iniziano i tuoi, ma i tuoi, devono finire là dove iniziano i MIEI!!!!

  5. #5
    Citazione Originariamente Scritto da ATT
    é un cosiglio del tutt PERSONALE!!!! io se fossi in te, ci starei alla larga, non da quelli Giapponesi, MA DA TUTTI gli EF, sono manovrati, in un modo INDEGNO e risentono degli umori giornalieri borsistici, indipendentemente dai risultati economci aziendali, della nazione o/e della situazione borsistica nazionale di riferimento (Giappone, India, Cina ecc...). Forse un mordi e fuggi!!! ma non sicuramente a lungo termine. Ovviamente, ogniuno é libero di pensarla a suo modo!!!!!

    con stima.............. Werther
    Gli etf azionari replicano indici composti da azioni quotate in certe borse, è ovvio che risentono degli umori giornalieri borsistici e delle situazioni borsistiche di riferimento. A loro volta i prezzi delle azioni a volte riflettono i fondamentali a volte no.
    Usati per il mordi e fuggi sono paragonabili al gioco d' azzardo

  6. #6
    Ogn'uno é padrone e responsabile delle proprie azioni!!!! se tu pensi che la quotazione degli ETF siano la logica conseguenza del mercato di riferimento, padrone di crederlo!!! io non mi fido e preferisco il mordi e fuggi. Ma ripeto é un mio punto di vista, derivante da quello che ho visto e da quello che stò vedendo.

    senza polemica e con rispetto ................. Werther
    i miei diritti, finiscono là dove iniziano i tuoi, ma i tuoi, devono finire là dove iniziano i MIEI!!!!

  7. #7
    Mi chiedo se tu capisca quello che vedi...C' è gente che pensa di saperla lunga, ha strane idee, ma semplicemente gli sfugge qualcosa.
    Per gli ETF sul Japan bisogna anche tenere conto del cambio e del fatto che replicano indici diversi dal Nikkei225.
    Chi vuole è libero di usare gli ETF in ottica di breve o brevissimo termine, questo non c' entra con il dato di fatto gli Etf replicano passivamente la composizione di un indice di mercato

    "Cosa sono gli ETF
    Definizione

    Gli Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) possono essere definiti, traducendo letteralmente dall'inglese, come "fondi quotati sul mercato". Questa definizione deriva dal fatto che gli ETF sono sostanzialmente dei fondi di investimento le cui azioni possono essere direttamente acquistate e vendute sul mercato azionario.
    Per rendere più l'idea, gli ETF si possono considerare dei fondi "vestiti" da azioni e di questi due strumenti finanziari mantengono le proprietà più interessanti.
    Come qualsiasi azione, infatti, è possibile in ogni momento della seduta di borsa, comprare o vendere azioni di un ETF al prezzo corrente di mercato. Rispetto ad un comune fondo di investimento, tale strumento è in grado di offrire quindi un maggior livello di trasparenza e di flessibilità, in quanto permette di monitorare costantemente l'andamento del proprio investimento.
    La possibilità di operare in modo diretto sul mercato permette, inoltre, di ridurre al minimo i tempi morti intercorrenti tra la decisione di investimento e l'effettiva realizzazione della stessa. Proprietà questa tanto più apprezzabile in situazioni estreme di mercato in cui l'impossibilità di operare in modo rapido può tradursi, nella migliore delle ipotesi, nella perdita di interessanti opportunità di profitto, quando non comporti invece un effettivo deprezzamento del valore del proprio capitale.
    Dall'altra parte però, come i normali fondi comuni di investimento, gli ETF consentono, con un'unica transazione, di detenere un portafoglio molto ben diversificato. Lo stesso risultato sarebbe, invece, molto più difficile da perseguire da un normale investitore privato che investisse direttamente in titoli azionari, sia a causa dei costi di transazione, sia per il tempo che sarebbe necessario dedicare ad un investimento di questo tipo.
    In conclusione, la peculiarità degli Exchange Traded Fund consiste nel racchiudere, in un unico strumento finanziario, la trasparenza e la flessibilità di un titolo azionario, unite all'elevata diversificazione ottenibile attraverso un investimento in un fondo comune."

    http://help.fineco.it/interna.asp?sez=127&ln=0

  8. #8
    Oct. 29 (Bloomberg) -- Asian stocks gained amid speculation Japan will cut interest rates and China will take steps to boost equities, adding to global efforts to revive confidence in financial markets.

    Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. climbed 10 percent after the Nikkei English News said the Bank of Japan may lower rates to 0.25 percent. Panasonic Corp., the world's largest maker of consumer electronics, jumped 10 percent after profit beat its quarterly target. BHP Billiton Ltd. advanced after prices for metals and oil gained. The Dow Jones Industrial Average surged 11 percent yesterday, helped by expectations the U.S. Federal Reserve will cut interest rates later today.

    The MSCI Asia Pacific Index added 4.9 percent to 81.52 as of 10:04 a.m. in Tokyo, extending yesterday's 3.4 percent rise. The Nikkei 225 Stock Average advanced 6.5 percent to 8,117.93, while the Korea Exchange halted program trading after index futures surged. Stocks rose in all markets open for trading.

    ``There's no way to know if this kind of rebound can continue or not,'' said Hideyuki Ookoshi, who helps oversee about $365 million at Chiba-Gin Asset Management Co. in Tokyo. ``What is certain is that the Nikkei dropping below 7,000 was a sign of a massive correction in share prices.''

    MSCI's Asian index has lost 49 percent this year and the Nikkei tumbled to a 26-year low earlier this week on concern the widening financial crisis and slowing economic growth will hurt company profits. MSCI's Asian measure now trades at 1.1 times book value, compared with the S&P 500's 1.8 times.

    Mitsubishi UFJ, Japan's biggest bank, jumped 10 percent to 607 yen. Mizuho Financial Group Inc., the second largest, rose 5.2 percent to 226,000 yen. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., the third biggest, gained 7.2 percent to 359,000 yen.

    The BOJ is considering lowering its benchmark rate by a quarter percentage point, the Nikkei reported. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve will announce its decision as early as today on interest rates.

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...KqA&refer=home

  9. #9
    Mizuho's Takeshita Says Japan Stocks `Good Strong Buy' October 29 (Bloomberg) -- Seijiro Takeshita, director and senior strategist at Mizuho International Plc, talked with Bloomberg's Susan Li from London yesterday about Sony Corp.'s profit decline, the performance of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.'s shares, and the outlook for Japanese stocks.

    http://www.bloomberg.com/avp/avp.htm?N=av&T=Mizuho's%20Takeshita%20Says%20Japan %20Stocks%20%60Good%20Strong%20Buy'&clipSRC=mms://media2.bloomberg.com/cache/v6PNttKgyxz4.asf

    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...d=a_MkJ0YitrfM

  10. #10
    November 26, 2008

    By Takehiro Sato | Tokyo

    Easing Has Not Gone as Far as Expected

    The decision to cut rates and pay interest on excess reserve deposits at the central bank spurred expectations that Japan, like the US, would see a period of QE (quantitative easing) without ZIRP (zero interest rate policy). However, the money-market operations by the bank since the November reserve accumulation period got underway suggest at this point that these expectations are not going to be fulfilled. We must stress ‘at this point’, because the policy pattern in the past has been for modest beginnings to result ultimately in extensive easing. The complementary deposit facility that pays interest on excess reserves is a measure to enhance provision of liquidity at year-end and fiscal year-end when demand for funds increases, and runs only until next April. We think that this system is likely to be ended in April-June next year, as the bank reinstates ZIRP, contrary to its initial intentions. Therefore, our view would not be altered even with the smaller-than-anticipated easing measures at this stage.

    The BoJ’s Stance Does Not Make Clear Whether it Wants to Provide Greater Liquidity or Not

    We cannot be alone in having the impression that the bank’s recent dialog with markets, including the rate cut at the end of October, has not been smooth. The cut was largely in line with our scenario, but came in abruptly, in contrast to the non-committal messages from the bank’s leadership up to that point. If a rate cut was going to be made, it would have had greater appeal coming in conjunction with the cuts made in concert in the US and Europe on October 8.

    The payment of interest on excess reserves was also a move that, as part of the steps to enhance liquidity provision, had been flagged by the governor to the administrative staff in the last but one MPM in September. Given the goal of greater liquidity provision, it would be natural for market participants to associate the result of supplying copious liquidity via extensive twist operations with allowing the overnight rate to drop below the target level to an extent, as in the US. In fact, the effective FF rate of around 0.5% has risen from about 0.25% in early November but is still well below the policy target of 1.0%.

    However, the Fed does not have flexible fund absorption facilities corresponding to issuance of ‘bills sold’ in the BoJ’s case, and faces a special situation where funds bearing no reserve deposit interest such as the GSEs due to restricted alternative investment opportunities are to be deposited with super-low interest in the FF market. As a result, the Fed has raised the interest paid on excess reserves in stages from the original FF minus 75bp to FF minus 35bp and then to the same level as the FF rate. Even so, under conditions of quantitative easing, the FF rate is still trending far below the targeted level, and the markets are reacting calmly, not interpreting the Fed’s recent increases in the reserve deposit rate as stealth rate hikes. In sum, the markets are showing a level of trust in the approach of the Fed, which is undertaking tough measures in quick succession to supply abundant liquidity. (The December FOMC meeting was originally scheduled for only one day, but has now been extended to two days (December 15-16, announced on November 20). It appears that further unconventional measures to achieve monetary easing will be discussed.)

    The contrasting money-market operations of the BoJ, where it is unclear whether the bank does or does not seek to increase provision of liquidity, may attract greater criticism in the markets. depending on how the economy and markets develop from here. Here we consider a rough overview of the economy and market in light of these circumstances.

    Overview of the Economy and Market

    We envisage the downturn climaxing in the current October-December and January-March quarters. Economic data continue to get worse in January-March. Production plans in manufacturing industry are down about 5%Q in October-December, with output declining at a rate that matches the aftermath of the IT bubble. On the micro side, there is no let-up in news of production cuts, especially for automobiles and IT goods, and job losses. GDP for October-December and the December Tankan continue to show similar deterioration, with the former running close to minus 3% annualized, and the latter headline showing a double-digit drop. Corporate earnings declined about 20% in 1H (for listed firms), almost matching our bearish outlook, but we expect steeper falls in 2H for a drop of 30% over the entire year.

    The problem is guidance for next fiscal year. Companies could well set extremely cautious targets, extrapolating from the sharp decline in 2H profits into next year, and analysts would presumably come out with guarded forecasts ahead of this. We expect this type of news to continue in March and April next year.

    Shortfall in corporate earnings outlooks for F3/10 would be a new drag on the stock market, and could well lead to further buying of the yen in the currency markets. The MoF is currently holding off from market intervention in response to the unwinding of the yen carry trade, but depending on the pace of the yen’s advance would not refrain indefinitely from intervention to push down the yen. As a result, with the BoJ not mopping up the funds supplied to the market by MoF’s yen-selling intervention (which is thus unsterilized), the BoJ would find itself passively overseeing a massive supply of funding.

    We see room in this process for two 15bp rate cuts, one in January-March and one in April-June. Depending on how constrained corporate financing is, unconventional measures similar to those used by the Fed could be taken. The governor has already directed the bank’s administrators to study and report back on steps to ease corporate financing by the next MPM. (The statement following the November MPM (November 21) included this direction from the governor: “The Bank will carry out purchases of CP under repurchase agreements more flexibly to facilitate corporate financing. Also, in this regard, the Chairman (governor) has instructed Bank staff to swiftly examine and report at the MPM possible changes in the treatment of corporate debt as collateral, as well as possible ways to enhance flexibility in funds-supplying operations collateralized by corporate debt.”) It is premature to think that all means have been exhausted, and there is a conceivable menu of policy options.

    Risks

    There appears to be some belief that aggressive provision of liquidity by central banks, including Japan’s, can contribute to a recovery in asset prices that have fallen sharply. Yet, expansion of central bank balance sheets is complementary to private sector balance sheet shrinkage, and no more than that. For example, the Fed’s balance sheet has ballooned to about US$2.2 trillion (+40%Y) in the week of November 19. The BoJ, while not on the same scale, has also seen a hefty increase of about JPY118 trillion (+12%Y) as of November 10. However, this is a counterpart to the contraction of credit in the private sector. In other words, in response to deleveraging in the private sector, the complementary supply of liquidity by central banks has not necessarily meant an increase in the absolute amount of currency supplied. Indeed, in Japan’s case, the money supply (M1) in October shrank at a faster rate (-1.1%Y) than in September (-0.5%), despite the increased supply of funds, and the apparent effects of private-sector deleveraging are also showing up in macro data. (Conversely, M1 in the US has increased sharply. See David Greenlaw’s US Economics: Revenge of the Ms, November 18, 2008 for details.)

    The BoJ also has swap agreements in place with the Fed, and responds to dollar funding needs of financial institutions that do business in Japan. However, clearly there is no question of provision of dollar funds by the BoJ spilling over into dollar funding for the financial and non-financial private sector. Both Japanese banks and foreign banks operating in Japan need to raise money in dollars to fund their dollar-denominated assets (lending overseas, etc.), but since such funding is currently tight, the BoJ and by extension the Fed, which should complement funding transactions between private sector counterparties, are supplying funds.

    The situation above resembles how funds did not feed into the real economy during quantitative easing, however much the BoJ supplied, because the balance sheet problems of the financial institutions had impaired the mechanism of credit intermediation. Japan’s experience shows clearly what needs to be fixed.


    http://www.morganstanley.com/views/g...tml#anchor7234

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